Category: English legal language and terminology

Ορισμένες πρώτες σκέψεις σχετικά με την απόφαση 221/2026 του Αρείου Πάγου.

Η υπόθεση αφορούσε ένα μακροχρόνιο έργο αιολικής ενέργειας, στο οποίο συμμετείχαν μια ελληνική εταιρεία ανάπτυξης έργων και ένας Ισπανός επενδυτής. Παρότι το έργο επρόκειτο να κατασκευαστεί στην Ελλάδα, η μεταξύ τους σχέση διεπόταν από συμβάσεις συνταγμένες στην αγγλική γλώσσα.

Όταν η σχέση αυτή οδηγήθηκε τελικά σε ρήξη, ο Ισπανός επενδυτής επέδωσε εξώδικη δήλωση με την οποία γνωστοποιούσε ότι είχε αποφασίσει να «terminate the … Contracts and withdraw from the Project».

Η έννοια και οι έννομες συνέπειες της δήλωσης αυτής αποτέλεσαν αντικείμενο της δίκης. Τα δικαστήρια που εξέτασαν την υπόθεση ασχολήθηκαν με το συμβατικό λεκτικό και τις ελληνικές μεταφράσεις.

Για περισσότερα, διαβάστε το άρθρο. ⬇️ Greek Supreme Court judgment No. 221/2026

 

Hellenic Supreme Court Judgment No. 221/2026 [1] contains an unusually useful example of translation becoming part of the legal problem in a cross-border dispute.

The underlying case concerned a long- running wind-energy project involving a Greek developer and a Spanish investor. Their relationship was governed by English-language contracts. When that relationship eventually broke down, the Spanish investor served an extrajudicial notice stating that it had decided to “terminate the … Contracts and withdraw from the Project”. The meaning and legal effect of that declaration became part of the litigation. The courts had to consider the contractual language, the Greek translations relied upon by the parties and the legal mechanism that the notice was attempting to exercise

The way the documents had been translated had become relevant to the court’s legal analysis of the dispute.

When terminology becomes part of the argument

The central translation issue concerned the English terms “withdrawal” and “withdraw”. The parties had produced different Greek renderings of the same contractual language. In the Framework Agreement, the Greek developer translated the heading “Withdrawal” as «Υπαναχώρηση». The Spanish investor’s translation used «Απόσυρση». Within the operative provisions of the Spanish investor’s own translation, however, “withdraw from their obligations” was rendered using «υπαναχώρηση», and the same term appeared again in the provisions describing the consequences of exercising that right. The Court of Appeal expressly identified the inconsistency.

That finding has an immediate practical significance for lawyers. A translation commissioned during the early stages of a matter may still be sitting in the file several years later when the meaning of the underlying provision becomes disputed. The terminology adopted at that earlier stage can then be compared with later translations of notices, correspondence, pleadings and exhibits. If the same contractual mechanism has been rendered differently across the record, counsel may have to explain why. In Judgment No. 221/2026, the inconsistency was visible to the court and formed part of its assessment of the competing terminology.

The legal significance of the words also depended on context. The Court of Appeal considered «υπαναχώρηση», «απόσυρση» and «αποχώρηση» in light of the contractual mechanism created by the relevant provisions and the legal consequences attached to it. It concluded that, in this particular contractual setting, “withdrawal” and “withdraw” were to be understood from the viewpoint of Greek law as «υπαναχώρηση» and «υπαναχωρώ». That reasoning is useful precisely because it is contextual. An English verb that appears straightforward at first sight may acquire a much narrower legal significance once it is placed inside a clause dealing with the exercise of a particular contractual right.

For counsel, this creates a clear risk-management issue. A translation can contain language that is perfectly intelligible and still create difficulty because the chosen terminology does not sit coherently with the legal mechanism expressed elsewhere in the contract. The problem becomes more serious where several translations have been commissioned at different times and the terminology has drifted. Once the dispute reaches court, those choices become part of the documentary history of the case.

Terminology drift

Cross-border disputes rarely arrive fully formed. They develop over time[2]. An agreement may be translated when advice is first sought. Correspondence may be translated months later. An extrajudicial notice may be prepared during an escalation of the dispute. Pleadings, exhibits and witness material may follow. Appeals and cassation proceedings can generate further translation requirements. The same underlying contractual concepts may therefore reappear in documents produced years apart.

That makes translation consistency a case-management issue. The important question is whether recurring concepts have been treated coherently across the file. Counsel should know how a key term was translated in the agreement, whether the same terminology was used in subsequent correspondence, and whether a later translation introduces a different Greek expression for the same contractual mechanism. If a change is deliberate, it should be capable of explanation. If it has happened accidentally because a later document was translated without access to the earlier material, the file has acquired an avoidable vulnerability[3].

Judgment No. 221/2026 gives this point real substance. The court did not examine one translated sentence in isolation. It moved across the Framework Agreement, the Project Agreement, the parties’ respective translations and the December 2015 notice. Earlier terminology informed the analysis of the later declaration. The documents formed a chain. For lawyers managing a bilingual dispute, the translation process needs to reflect that same chain.

This has implications for the way instructions are given. A translator dealing with an operative notice may need the underlying agreement and its existing translation. A translator working on pleadings may need to see the terminology already adopted in the evidence. Where a concept is genuinely ambiguous, counsel may need to decide how that ambiguity should be handled before the translation is finalised. Those steps reduce the chance that terminology will develop independently across documents that will ultimately be read together.

The legal effect of a few words

The December 2015 notice brought these issues into focus. Its English text stated that the Spanish investor had decided to “terminate the … Contracts and withdraw from the Project”. The Court of Appeal considered that the wording raised a question about the juridical character of the declaration, because the two expressions potentially pointed towards different legal mechanisms.

The court then examined the consequences contemplated by the notice. Among other things, the Spanish investor proposed the transfer of its shares in the project company for a nominal price. That consequence corresponded with the contractual mechanism provided for in Article 5.2 of the Framework Agreement in connection with withdrawal. The court therefore characterised the declaration as an exercise of contractual υπαναχώρηση.

For a lawyer reviewing a translation, this is an important point of method. Operative language has to be read through the legal function of the document. A notice may be exercising a right, triggering a contractual consequence or attempting to bring a legal relationship to an end. A translation choice affecting the characterisation of that act deserves a different level of scrutiny from a purely descriptive passage in the factual record.

That distinction is easy to miss where the disputed English word appears ordinary and is not a term of art. “Withdraw” is common language. In this case, it was connected with a contractual right carrying defined conditions and consequences. A translator who treats the word as an isolated lexical problem may produce a fluent version while missing the legal architecture around it. Counsel then inherits that decision when the document is relied upon in proceedings.

The judgment provides another example in the word “feasibility”. Article 3.5 of the Project Agreement referred to the project’s “technical and financial feasibility”. One translation rendered the term as «βιωσιμότητα». The Court of Appeal considered «σκοπιμότητα» the appropriate rendering in the context of the provision.

The point is useful because “feasibility” does not immediately look like a difficult legal term. Within Article 3.5, however, it formed part of the condition governing whether the investor could exercise its right to withdraw from the project. Its importance came from the work it was doing in the clause.

Commercial contracts contain many expressions of this kind. “Material”, “reasonable”, “completion”, “default”, “acceptance”, “notice”, “cause” and similar words can acquire considerable significance through their contractual function. Their translation requires attention to the surrounding rights, obligations and consequences. The presence of familiar vocabulary should not encourage a lighter review where the clause itself performs important legal work.

For counsel, the practical implication is straightforward. Review effort should follow legal significance. A term embedded in a provision governing termination, withdrawal, liability, payment, default or another important contractual mechanism deserves close attention even if the English itself appears routine.

The risk often lies in the relationship between the word and the clause, not in the word viewed on its own.

AI does not remove the need for file-level verification

The same issue arises when machine translation or generative AI is incorporated into the workflow. Glossaries and terminology instructions can improve consistency across large volumes of material. They are useful tools, particularly where a case contains recurring technical or contractual language. Their effectiveness still needs to be verified against the documents that matter.

Generative systems produce language probabilistically. A preferred term may be supplied in a glossary and still appear differently in another passage. The system may preserve the chosen word while misunderstanding the legal relationship expressed by the clause. Large-scale use therefore creates a practical review question for counsel: have the legally significant occurrences actually been checked against the agreement and against the terminology already used elsewhere in the file?

That question becomes particularly important where translation work is divided across several stages of a dispute. An AI-assisted translation of a new notice may be linguistically polished and internally coherent while departing from terminology established years earlier in the contract. Without a case-level review, the divergence may remain invisible until the documents are placed side by side in proceedings.

Translation risk

Judgment No. 221/2026 does not support the claim that the Spanish investor lost because of a bad translation. After the December notice had been characterised as an exercise of υπαναχώρηση, the courts still had to determine whether the contractual conditions for exercising that right had been met. Article 3.5 allowed withdrawal where the project’s technical or financial feasibility had proved insufficient under the relevant conditions. The Court of Appeal found that the notice did not specify whether the alleged inadequacy was technical, economic or both, and did not identify the supporting data. The attempted exercise of the right therefore failed on substantive grounds. The Supreme Court rejected the cassation challenge to that conclusion.

The translation issue nevertheless mattered because it formed part of the route by which the legal act was characterised. That is a realistic model of translation risk in contentious work. The danger is often cumulative. An inconsistent term, an unexamined synonym, a later document translated without reference to the underlying agreement, or an ordinary commercial word carrying an important contractual threshold can create an additional point requiring submissions and judicial analysis.

Cross-border litigation already contains enough genuine uncertainty. Translation should be managed so that it does not introduce further avoidable ambiguity into the record. Judgment No. 221/2026 shows how easily terminology can become part of the forensic material once a dispute turns on the legal effect of the documents themselves. For Greek lawyers working with English-language contracts, the case offers a practical reason to treat translated terminology as part of the case strategy from the outset, with the same attention to consistency, context and legal consequence that is applied to the original documents.

#GreekLaw #LegalTranslation #ContractualDisputes

[1] https://shorturl.at/f0m4s. The judgment is in Greek.

[2] Scott, J., O’Shea, J. How Legal Documents Translated Outside Institutions Affect Lives, Businesses and the Economy. Int J Semiot Law 34, 1331–1373 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09815-5

[3] Scott, J. & O’Shea, J., ‘Legal Systems Exposed: Translation and Vulnerabilities’ in Anne Wagner and Aleksandra Matulewska (eds), Research Handbook on Jurilinguistics (Edward Elgar Publishing 2023) 300 https://doi.org/10.4337/9781802207248.00029

Ius et Translatum: English-Greek / Greek-English Legal Glossary – A review

Marta Chromá has written that “legal translation implies both a comparative study of different legal systems and an awareness of the problems created by the absence of equivalent concepts, legal institutions, terms and other linguistic units. As pointed out by Kischel … ‘the question in legal translation is not which translation is right, but more modestly, which one is less wrong’”[1].Continue Reading..

Launching a new series of interviews with legal translators and experts in the field of legal translation, we have an interview with Eleni Nanaki, Attorney at Law LL.M – author and publisher of the bilingual legal glossaries in the ius et translatum series who talks to us about challenges in legal translation as seen by an international lawyer…Continue Reading..

It is not just legal language that can be difficult to comprehend for the layman and legal translator alike. Often, it is the very content of legal texts that is strange. And the UK has no shortage of bizarre British laws if authors and journalists are to be believed.

From time to time books are published about England’s weird and wonderful laws. Nigel Crawthorne’s The Strange Laws of Old England (2004) is a hilarious case in point. And today the Guardian published a short story about a study commissioned by an insurance company that looks at whether obscure legislation is really needed. It offers a list of the 10 most bizarre British laws “to highlight the complexity and antiquity of statutes that remain in force”. The study has been prepared by a Ph.D. student at the University of Cambridge and -as is normally the case with lists or compilations of this type- contains some truly odd stuff.

Here are some short excerpts from the article:

“Section 12 of the 1872 Licensing Act declares that “every person found drunk … on any licensed premises, shall be liable to a penalty”. It was enacted to reduce consumption of alcohol and to encourage sobriety among the poor. It remains in force within England and Wales as a rule prohibiting public drunkenness.

The Metropolitan Police Act 1839 makes it an offence for any person to carry any cask, tub, hoop, wheels, ladders, planks or poles on a footway “except for the purpose of loading or unloading any cart or carriage”. It was passed to ensure people could move freely along public thoroughfares without obstruction.

MPs are prohibited from wearing armour in parliament by the Bearing of Armour Act which dates back to 1313. It was an attempt by Edward II to prevent nobles from threatening to use force when parliament was called. The Earl of Lancaster, it was reported, still attended parliament carrying weapons until at least 1319.

… a different part of the 1872 Licensing Act … outlaws being drunk in charge of cattle; the 1986 Salmon Act – intended to ban poaching – makes it illegal to handle salmon in suspicious circumstances; a 19th-century law bans the beating of carpets after 8am on streets in London.”

To read the full article about these bizarre British laws, click here.

 

 

In one of our previous posts we talked about the cultural inconsistencies in legal translation that often come up and specifically about inconsistencies in the realia. In this post, we are going to talk about the ways in which the legal translator can tackle these inconsistencies.

We gave an example using the term “fiduciary” and its Greek translation, but we concluded that there isn’t an equivalent term that has the exact same meaning and an identical content in the Greek legal system. What needs to be stressed here is the fact that the legal translator is able to reach this conclusion only if he is familiar with the law of both the legal systems involved: the legal system from which the source text comes and the legal system from which the target text comes. Familiarity with the first will enable the translator to have a clear grasp of the meaning, the content and the function of the concept, the term or the realia that he needs to translate. Familiarity with the second will enable him to look for the respective concept, term or realia in the target language.

As in the example that we used in our previous post, in the case where there isn’t an equivalent concept, term or realia, the translator should embrace the interpretative approach, aiming at the same time to ensure that the final recipient of the text will be able to understand it. The target text will be used in the context of a different legal system by people familiar only with their own legal system. The translator’s aim should be to clearly present the foreign legal system, without altering the structure and the legal effect of the text and of course without adding to or subtracting from the amount of information that the final recipient will draw from his translated text.

Hard? Yes. Impossible? No.

In any case, the legal translator should contact his client and advise him about the implications that arise from the inconsistencies of the two cultures involved, as well as about the ways in which he is planning to tackle those cultural inconsistencies in legal translation.

In our example I chose to translate the term “fiduciary” as “διαχειριστής αλλότριας περιουσίας” (administrator of another’s affairs), drawing my inspiration from the concept of “management of another’s affairs/voluntary agency” (διοίκηση αλλοτρίων) in Article 730 of the Hellenic Civil Code. The reason that the English term couldn’t have been translated as “διοικητής αλλοτρίων” (manager of another’s affairs/voluntary agent) is because there is a crucial difference between those two concepts: the agent mentioned in Article 730 of the Greek Civil Code manages the affairs of another person, but acts without authority, while the fiduciary acts under a mandate.

Just like any translator, the legal translator should also cultivate his multiculturalism, as this is a necessary professional tool. Since any form of cross-language communication is also cross-cultural communication (Vlachopoulos, p. 36) and every legal system is created within a specific culture, it is more than necessary for the legal translator to be aware of and be exposed to his own, as well as the foreign culture. This is the very heart of the role of the professional legal translator, as he is the person responsible for transferring the message and the content of the legal text from one culture to the other and finding solutions to the legal inconsistencies in his legal translation.

According to Vlachopoulos, who in turn refers to the research of Maddux & Galinsky in the field of business administration (Vlachopoulos, p. 37), simply knowing the language, as a sum of finite linguistic units and syntactical mechanisms, without being aware of the cultural elements reflected in the usage of a specific word or in the usage of a specific syntactical mechanism and without being conscious of the significance these elements bear in the foreign culture, dooms every effort of cross-cultural communication to failure. In other words, lack of awareness of the cultural parameters defeats creative understanding and leads to a linear and uncritical transfer of structures of the source language to the target language. It leads, above all, to an uncritical transfer of the thought structures of the source culture to the target culture. Vlachopoulos then he goes on to say that it is necessary for the translator to be familiar with the cultures with which he is working, so that, firstly, he can possess the knowledge and the experience that will support his understanding of the target culture and secondly, to be able to assess the acceptance criteria and in this way be able to converge to the highest possible extent with the communication standards that he is required to respect.

In the context of cross-cultural communication, therefore, the skilled legal translator should possess an awareness of the legal culture of both countries and keep himself constantly informed about new legislation, new case-law and the changes taking place in his own, as well as in the foreign legal system.

 

By Eva Angelopoulou

Translation of legal documents and complicated legal language

On 29 June, I attended an interesting afternoon about the drafting of legislation and some of the difficulties it poses, with some discussion of the translation of legal documents thrown in too and a lot of interesting input from the audience from legal interpreters who often have to deal with the complexities of legal language and explain them to the ordinary man.

6 speakers presented different issues relating to law and language (and raised the topic of legal translation). Brief summaries are set out below that highlight the key issues of interest in the translation of legal documents.

Hayley Rogers, a UK legislative drafter, outlined the UK legislative drafting process and some of the difficulties it presents. She argued that legislative drafters tend to see themselves as ‘architects’ but often the practicalities of the drafting process mean they are actually more akin to ‘cowboy builders’ creating chaotic-looking legislation because of a series of constraints (primarily political and policy-related) imposed on the drafters.  So instead of striving for perfection they often just have to cope with the world ‘as it is’. This may resonate with legal translators who face demands for perfection from clients, but are constrained by real world factors like short delivery deadlines.

Prof. Maria De Benedetto spoke about how the language of the law is often incomprehensible to the layman, how it is a language of the elite, and outlined some of the techniques those who speak the language of the law utilise to maintain their elite status, such as reliance on Latin when ordinary people are unlikely to comprehend it.

James Hadley is new to legal translation as a discipline but comes from a strong background in translation theory. He is currently involved in a project being run by the Institute of Modern Languages Research (IMLR) in partnership with the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (IALS) exploring some of these key questions that arise when laws and legal documents need to be translated from one language to another. His presentation looked at equivalence and legal translation and his working hypothesis is that equivalence (defined as “the notion that a translated text produces the same effect for its readers as the source text did for its own” may be demonstrable in legal language.

He posited that those who are capable of doing legal translations properly will need to have a very specific skill set, represented by the following Venn diagram:

The skill set need for the translation of legal documents

The skill set need for the translation of legal documents

 

Nothing original here, but it is always good that key issues in the discipline are presented to new audiences and that more people become educated about legal translation and what it entails, who can do it, and so on.

It will be interesting to hear more about his research as it becomes available.  According to the School of Advanced Studies website, the larger project that Hadley’s research relates to will look at who legal translators should be, how to assess the quality of their work, and what issues reading a legal document may raise from a language / law viewpoint.  Legal translation is taking place all the time, and may entail the translation of laws that have the same effect as the original language version in bi- and multi-lingual jurisdictions. Outside of an institutional context, that sort of legal translation is a rarity. Much more common is the translation of legal documents for other reasons: international commerce, the purchase of land, employees working in other countries needing to know their rights. Legal language is complicated though; often dubbed negatively as ‘legalese’ which is difficult to understand even for native speakers of the source language. To quote the School’s announcement about the upcoming project, “That being the case, and legal traditions around the world being so variable, it is easy to see how translating legal documents from one language to another would be no mean feat. Even if you do happen to speak both languages, you also need to understand, and be able to reproduce the respective forms of legalese with an extremely high degree of technical accuracy.”

William Robinson, Associate Research Fellow at IALS, spoke about the complexities of the EU drafting process, highlighting the important role of translators in the overall process.

Stephen Neale, Professor of Philosophy and Linguistics, examined the question of ‘interpreting’ the meaning of words and highlighted the importance of context in coming up with good and bad faith interpretations of what legal words actually mean. He pointed out that judges, often considered to be the final arbiters of what the law ‘means’ often don’t have a strong grasp of linguistics, and gave some examples of ‘weird’ outcomes in cases where the judges appeared to go against the ‘common sense’ meaning of the words. His assertion is that there is a set of heuristics we use all the time to figure out the common sense meaning intended by others and that intrinsically we all know when an ‘interpretation’ is in bad faith.

Jerome Tessuto provided a data-driven analysis of how writing styles and language conventions from one country can influence those of another, by looking at the impact of English arbitration legislation on Singapore’s arbitration legislation.  He pointed out that while deontic modality, and the use of shall in particular, is on the decline in English legislation because of the impact of the Plain Language movement, his data revealed that it was still important in Singaporean legislation, though an audience member who was a legislative drafter from Singapore pointed out that recently that has begun to change.

 

 

“Why is legal language so complicated? Legislative drafters and linguists compare notes”

Dealing with legal language all day long, legal translators are definitely aware that it is complicated stuff. This workshop, to be held in London by the Institute of Modern Languages Research at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on 29.6.2016, takes a look at how the viewpoint of the linguist can be co-opted to help legislative drafters produce better quality texts (and hopefully make legal translation an easier process too).

 

More information: http://www.sas.ac.uk/support-research/public-events/2016/why-legal-language-so-complicated-legislative-drafters-and-lin-1

THE TERMS “SUBJECT TO”, “NOTWITHSTANDING” OR “WITHOUT PREJUDICE”: WHICH ONE SHOULD YOU CHOOSE?

I was recently reading this interesting article by Andrew Nickels about the clauses “subject to”, “notwithstanding” and “without prejudice” and it got me thinking how useful the clarification of these terms would be for the purposes of legal translation.

Every legal translator has encountered one or all of these terms in a contract or some other legal document they had to translate, either to or from English. These shorthand expressions prove to be useful tools in saving time when it comes to drafting a contract and that’s why lawyers and legal practitioners use them often.

What do they really mean though in plain English? Are they always used correctly? Continue Reading..

Translating the workings of a civil law system into English (common law) terminology can be extremely difficult, as all those who have ever attempted it will know. The reason for the complexity is simple; translating from one system to another system is far from straightforward. When, for example a Dutch lawyer has to explain his legal system to a common law lawyer, it is not simply a matter of replacing Dutch words with English words. The Dutch system is not a carbon copy of the English system, which means that there will not always be equivalent English terminology at hand for translation purposes. In order to use English legal terminology correctly and effectively, the practitioner must not only be familiar with his own legal system, but also have a basic grasp of the structure of the common law system.

Source: Helen Gubby, English legal terminology: Legal concepts in language (Boom Juridische Studieboeken)

by Eva Angelopoulou

The University of the Aegean’s Department of Information & Communication Systems Engineering has recently released a GR-EN / EN-GR glossary of e-Government terms.

To view it click here: http://icsdweb.aegean.gr/project/lexiko/


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